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RETHINKING THE SECOND AMERICAN
REVOLUTION: LEGAL TENDER AND
NATIONAL BANKING IN THE
CIVIL WAR ERA
Michael T. Caires*
Charles Beard had an undeniable flare for rethinking
American History. These collected essays mark the anniversary
of Beard’s path-breaking, and now infamous, An Economic
Interpretation of the Constitution. Yet Beard, along with his wife
Mary Ritter Beard, used that same view of the history of
American politics and society to re-think, not just the founding,
but the entire sweep of American history in their influential
survey The Rise of American Civilization, published in 1927. One
standout chapter of that book is their interpretation of the
American Civil War. In “The Second American Revolution,” the
Beards argued that the real significance of the Civil War was not
found in the war itself, but in the economic transformation of the
North. This thesis has had a long life among scholars, and while
portions of the Beardian story have been refuted, it is safe to say
that the larger perspective offered by the Beards remains at the
bedrock of how many historians view the overarching narrative
1
and significance of the Civil War.
My purpose in this essay is to provide a brief overview of the
Beardian view of the Civil War and its current place in the
historiography. I will then suggest some ways that the Beardian
story fails us and our perspective on the history of American
political economy during the war by discussing the origins of the
Legal Tender Act and the National Banking Act in the Civil War
* Pre-Doctoral Fellow, Bankard Fund in Political Economy, 2012–13, University
of Virginia.
1. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES (1913); 2 CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, THE RISE OF
AMERICAN CIVILIZATION: THE INDUSTRIAL ERA 52–121 (1927). See generally Philip
Shaw Paludan, What Did the Winners Win?: The Social and Economic History of the North
during the Civil War, in WRITING THE CIVIL WAR: THE QUEST TO UNDERSTAND 174
(James M. McPherson & William J. Cooper, Jr., eds., 1998).
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Era. In short, what I would like to suggest is that these policies
grew out of the failure of the antebellum monetary system and
represented an effort to control and regulate the contours of
American capitalism.
I. BEARD’S CIVIL WAR
The Beardian perspective has the benefit of being
refreshingly simple and straightforward. People’s material
interests motivate their actions. A strong sub-theme of Beard’s
interpretation of American history is a constant story of what
political scientists now term “capture.” The forces of capital and
industry use their power to hijack public institutions and realign
them to create a political economy conducive to their interests. In
his Economic Interpretation, there is a clear sense of class
divisions as the capitalists and merchants unite to wrest control
over the country’s economic future from the more popular
agrarian class. Applying the idea to the mid-nineteenth century,
the Beards saw class as subsumed in region. They argued that
southern secession allowed the forces of industry in the North to
capture the federal government from the hands of the southern
planter class, and with the capture began the ascendance of what
2
they dubbed “the industrial age” in American history.
It’s still a shocking thesis to read from the perspective of 21st
century historiography. With sweeping prose, the Beards
dismissed all the images of the war that their readers were
accustomed to. The battles and generals were only a romantic
gloss to the real substance of change that Beard found:
[T]he core of the vortex lay elsewhere. It was in the flowing
substance of things limned by statistical reports on finance,
commerce, capital, industry, railways, and agriculture, by
provisions of constitutional law, and by the pages of statute
books—prosaic muniments which show that the so-called civil
war was in reality a Second American Revolution and in a strict
3
sense, the First.

The Beards even hedged the significance of emancipation in
the light of the ascendance of this new power. To the progressives,
it provided an origin point for understanding exactly how business
2. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION, supra note 1, at 53–54; William
J. Novak, A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture: A Short, Inglorious History, in
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO
LIMIT IT 25 (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds., 2014).
3. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION, supra note 1, at 54.
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captured the federal government in the Gilded Age. Many other
authors prior to World War II picked up the Beardian view of the
4
war and fleshed out the narrative to include Reconstruction.
The thesis underwent an intense examination over the course
of the 1960s. The Beards emphasized that the real revolution
could be found in the economic indicators of the northern
economy, yet they did no real economic analysis to support this
point. Thomas Cochran and Stanley Engerman famously refuted
the notion that there was an economic take-off during the Civil
War years. Their economic research concluded that the war
actually had the opposite effect on GDP and industrial output,
and most likely slowed the pace of industrial growth. Moreover,
Robert P. Sharkey and Irwin Unger disassembled the idea that
there was a united north during Reconstruction on the greenback
issue. Iron producers in Pennsylvania clashed with northeast
financial elites over the questions of contraction, resumption of
specie payments, and by extension the economic future of the
5
country.
Yet, it cannot be denied that while the specifics of the Beard
thesis have lost their luster, the thrust of their argument—that an
industrial North trumped the agricultural South—seems to
remain in place. James McPherson’s widely read survey of the
6
Civil War, Battle Cry of Freedom, endorsed this view. Richard
Franklin Bensel’s 1990 Yankee Leviathan remains the central
work on how and why the federal government became stronger in
7
the war years, and largely rests on the Beardian view.
To be sure, Bensel refined and brought up to date the
Beardian Civil War with careful attention to the nature of state
development in the mid-nineteenth century. Explicitly using the
capture perspective and comparing the U.S. to other states,
Bensel posited that the Civil War allowed the Republican party
to capture the U.S. government and use it as a tool for their
developmental policies. Prior to 1860, the stagnation of national
4. Paludan, supra note 1, at 174–89; ROBERT P. SHARKEY, MONEY, CLASS, AND
PARTY: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 3–14 (1967).
5. SHARKEY, supra note 4; IRWIN UNGER, THE GREENBACK ERA: A SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FINANCE, 1865-1879 (1964); Thomas Cochran, Did
the Civil War Retard Industrialization?, 48 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 197 (1961); Stanley
L. Engerman, The Economic Impact of the Civil War, 3 EXPLORATIONS
ENTREPRENEURIAL HIST. 176 (1966).
6. JAMES MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 452
(1988).
7. RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, YANKEE LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS OF
CENTRAL STATE AUTHORITY IN AMERICA, 1859-1877 (1990).
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authority was a result of southern leaders who kept the central
state weak to prevent its interference with the institution of
slavery. Bensel avoided the Beards’ oversimplifications by adding
the wrinkle that the state helped create class. In short, he
suggested that the national debt created a new class of financial
elites, who then used their power over national policy to cut short
the reconstruction of the South, foreshadowing a state that would
use its powers to the advantage of capital over that of agriculture
8
and labor.
There has never been a better time to return to the “vortex”
that the Beards described. The most recent and important
contributions to the historiography of the Civil War have largely
focused their attention away from the political economy of the
9
North. Focusing on monetary legislation, I hope to provide a new
perspective about the kind of federal state that the Union won
during the Civil War.
My research tries to understand civil war monetary policy
within the context of its origins. With the Beards, greenbacks and
national banking are simple products of war. Beard goes a bit
farther by arguing that national banking was the pet-project of
10
“business enterprise.” Moreover, we are left to believe that these
policies were the ultimate victory for Hamiltonian and Whiggish
11
thought, a thesis that stands to this day. Upon careful
examination, neither the Legal Tender Act nor the National
Banking System fully conforms to this narrative. Each of these
laws interjected the federal government into the political
economy of the United States in what were widely seen as novel
and intrusive ways. The style and substance of this intrusion
borrowed as much from Democratic thought as it did from the
Whigs. In the end these policies were not the same kind of
promotional policies as the Pacific Railway Act, the Homestead
Act, or tariff policy. Ultimately the growth of national monetary
power was an effort to reform and stabilize the chaotic currency
system of the nineteenth century.

8. Id. at 10–17, 68–69, 238–302.
9. See the discussion of present and future trends in the special roundtable on the
future of Civil War studies in 2 J. CIV. WAR ERA 3–10 (2012).
10. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION, supra note 1, at 108.
11. See, e.g., MCPHERSON, supra note 6, at 450.
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II. AMERICAN MONEY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR
The place to start is not with what the Beards termed “the
industrial vortex of the Northeast,” but the Wildcat Banks of the
Midwest. In 1861, the banking system of Illinois imploded, taking
with it many of the banks of the Midwest. A banking collapse,
then and now, usually meant a freeze on credit and a slowing of
commerce. The immediate effects of this collapse created a more
immediate problem. It wiped out the monetary system of the
entire region. That was only possible because the monetary
system of mid-nineteenth century America depended on a species
12
of currency that we would not recognize as money today.
Gold was technically the only legal money of the United
States in 1861. Contractual debts for money could only be
satisfied with gold and silver coin minted by the U.S. government.
Yet the scarcity of coin in the United States led most Americans
to depend on notes issued by hundreds of banks across the
country. Since before the War of 1812, banks served as the
primary money manufacturers and regulators of the monetary
system, with state governments providing various levels of
oversight. Once chartered, an individual bank would aggregate
coin and issue notes based on these reserves. The face of each note
promised that the holder could present the note at the window of
the cashier and get the par value in coin. With the belief that the
note was as good as gold, it could pass from hand to hand and
function as the circulating medium of a given community or
region. That was the ideal situation; in reality, there was little to
stop banks from issuing paper in excess of their reserves. Such
notes did circulate, but at a discount depending on the reputation
of the bank. The multiplicity of notes also lent itself to rampant
counterfeiting. Thus mid-nineteenth century Americans had to
navigate a world of money where one was constantly trying to
evaluate and judge the value of the paper in their pocket. It is
from our 21st century perspective a complex, confusing system,
capable of providing cheap credit, but always on the edge of
13
another collapse, as it was in the Panics of 1819, 1837, and 1857.
12. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION, supra note 1, at 4; EMERSON
DAVID FITE, SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS IN THE NORTH DURING THE CIVIL
WAR 110–11 (1930); BRAY HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY AND AN EMPTY PURSE: BANKS
AND POLITICS IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 37–38 (1970); HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE
GREATEST NATION OF THE EARTH: REPUBLICAN ECONOMIC POLICES DURING THE
CIVIL WAR 67–68 (1997); STEPHEN MIHM, A NATION OF COUNTERFEITERS:
CAPITALISTS, CON MEN, AND THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES (2007).
13. Federal laws relating to legal tender came as sections to laws dealing with the
regulation of the gold and silver currency. For example the act of 1853 revaluing the half-
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A regulatory role for the federal government in the national
monetary system was largely out of the question due to the legal
and political history of the previous fifty years. Due to the
framers’ anger over the various state-issued currencies of the
Revolutionary era, and their shame and disgust over the
depreciation of the Continentals issued by Congress during the
War for Independence, the Constitution contained an odd
constellation of monetary provisions. The unanimity of the
framers on the powers of the states is reflected in Article I, Section
10’s ban on state-issued paper money (known as bills of credit)
and the restriction disallowing states from using gold and silver as
a legal tender. A provision allowing for the federal government to
issue bills of credit was also struck down during debate in 1787.
On that point, however, some delegates believed that the U.S.
14
could issue paper, as long as it was not a legal tender.
The Constitution, moreover, said nothing about banks. In
1787 there were three banks in the United States. The few chance
references to banking at the constitutional convention showed
that the delegates were thinking about large national banks like
the Bank of England or the Bank of North America. No one could
predict the proliferation of small banks that issued money across
the country in the decades after ratification. James Madison
confessed many years later that the state banks were a “great evil”
that were “not foreseen” at the time of the writing of the
15
Constitution. When the banking system collapsed during the
War of 1812, federal leaders and commentators saw the decentralized banking system as a weakness and the primary cause
of panic. The problem in the way of meaningful reform was a
strongly rooted belief in the constitutionality of state banks.
State legislatures incorporated and regulated the banks,
making banking and note-issue functions of state power. With the
Constitution silent on the subject of currency created by state
dollar, quarter, dime. and half-dime, declared that silver coins would be a legal tender for
debts under five dollars. See Act of Feb. 21, 1853, ch. 79 (10 Stat. 160). See also Act of Apr.
2, 1792, ch. 16, §16 (1 Stat. 250); BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA,
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 10–11 (1957); David A. Martin, Bimetallism
in the United States before 1850, 76 J. POL. ECON. 428 (1968); David A. Martin, U.S. Gold
Production Prior to the California Gold Rush, 13 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 437 (1976);
Edward J. Stevens, Composition of the Money Stock Prior to the Civil War, 3 J. MONEY,
CREDIT & BANKING 84 (1971).
14. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 308–10 (Max Farrand,
ed., 1911).
15. Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll (Feb. 1831), in 3 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 463 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds., 1987), available
at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_10_1s22.html.
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corporations, decades of custom and usage led to a widespread
belief that the states had acquired a right to create banks that
would produce paper money. An attack on that right would
require a rethinking of American federalism that the
Jeffersonian-Jacksonian generation refused to consider. The
bitterest enemies of the banks, including President Andrew
Jackson and Thomas Hart Benton, conceded that the state banks
were out of federal reach. In 1836, Aaron Vanderpoel, a
Democrat from New York, thought the intent against a fractured
currency system was clear in the Constitution but noted that
custom and usage had turned Article I, Section 10 into a “dead
16
letter.” He explained, based on common law principles,
the states had for more than forty years exercised the power of
incorporating banks with power to issue notes; and if the
original exercise of this power was founded in usurpation and
error . . . it was, at all events, an error so old and so general as
17
to have acquired the authority of right and law.

This belief in the constitutionality of the banks informed
constitutional law. When Missouri tried to issue its own paper
money (under the guise of state loan office certificates), Chief
Justice John Marshall found it easy to strike these notes down as
18
state bills of credit in Craig v. Missouri. When the question of
state bank notes came directly before the Court in Briscoe v. Bank
of Kentucky, a new Taney court majority held for the state’s right
19
to create banks of issue. Yet it would be a mistake to view the
issue of state banks as a product of Democratic versus Whig
constitutional thought. Marshall had just passed away, and Justice
Joseph Story said that he would have found against the Bank of
Kentucky. But what was at issue was the degree to which the Bank
of Kentucky was a direct organ of the Kentucky legislature. In this
case the Commonwealth of Kentucky held the majority of shares
of the bank, and state coffers paid its employees. In his dissent
Story agreed with the majority that it was perfectly constitutional
for states to create banks that issued notes based on a reserve of
coin.
The one viable option to regulate the welter of banks before
the Civil War was indirect federal control. The Bank of the United
States was not originally envisioned by Alexander Hamilton as a
16.
17.
18.
19.

CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 2d sess., app. 51 (1836).
Id. (emphasis in original).
Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. 410 (1830).
Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S 257 (1837).
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means of regulating the state banks. The bank grew into that role,
especially the Second Bank of the United States. By the 1830s, the
BUS developed a system of acquiring bank notes from all over the
country and holding them in reserve. State banks would restrict
their issues out of fear that the BUS could present all those notes
for payment on the same day, thus forcing suspension. Critically,
from the Hamiltonian-Whig point of view the bank was an
attractive policy option because it worked with the market, as
opposed to government-issued paper money that was subject to
the whims of democracy. As explained by Hamilton, a legislature
would always print paper in an emergency before it would raise
taxes, and thus, “so certain of being abused, that the wisdom of
government will be shown in never trusting itself with the use of
20
so seducing and dangerous an expedient.” Nevertheless, the
BUS succumbed to attacks by Jeffersonians and Jacksonians, and
by the late 1840s even its admirers, such as a young Abraham
Lincoln, confessed that another BUS was out of the question as a
21
matter of politics.
Direct regulation was in the hands of the market and the
states that chartered them. After 1837, coalitions of Democrats
and Whigs passed legislation that regularized the chartering of
banks and attempted to regulate note issue with reserve
requirements monitored by new state banking departments. In
the biggest financial centers, banks banded together into clearing
house associations that helped stabilize their local systems by
pooling funds to support weak member banks and regulating
interbank payments. In practice this patchwork of reform worked
imperfectly. Especially in the West, stories abounded of banks
that duped regulators. In a few extreme cases, several western
states banned banknotes all together. It was within this volatile
market that the federal government expanded its reach during the
22
Civil War.

20. Alexander Hamilton, “Report on a National Bank,” 1 ANNALS OF CONG., app.
2096 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
21. Abraham Lincoln, Fragment: What General Taylor Ought to Say, in 1 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 454 (Roy P. Basler, ed., 1953).
22. LEONARD CLINTON HELDERMAN, NATIONAL AND STATE BANKS: A STUDY OF
THEIR ORIGINS 101–32 (1931); WILLIAM G. SHADE, BANKS OR NO BANKS: THE MONEY
ISSUE IN WESTERN POLITICS, 1832-1865 (1972); JAMES ROGERS SHARP, THE
JACKSONIANS VERSUS THE BANKS: POLITICS IN THE STATES AFTER THE PANIC OF 1837
(1970).
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III. LEGAL TENDER
The problem of the banks was not just a problem for business
in peacetime; it was also a serious problem for the U.S.
government in time of war and financial panic. Without a BUS,
the federal government had no inflationary tools to help pay the
cost of war. It was during the War of 1812 that the federal
government began issuing its own paper money, called Treasury
notes. The notes passed constitutional muster because most
members of Congress could justify them as an act of borrowing.
Each note promised a redemption date and was good for public
dues owed to the U.S. While most Democrats favored gold, it was
attractive during a time of emergency to use the people’s credit in
the form of notes managed by the people’s representatives as
opposed to trusting in state banks or a single BUS. Democraticdominated Congresses repeated and strengthened this tradition
in the Panic of 1837, the Mexican American War, the Panic of
1857, and as late as 1860 on the verge of the Civil War. The fact
was that when the monetary system went into disarray during
each of these financial or military emergencies, Jeffersonians and
Jacksonians welcomed incursions by the government into the
structure of the American political economy.
The size and nature of the Civil War forced Congress to take
this tradition one step further. In the winter of 1861 and 1862 the
banks of New York City suspended specie payments, taking the
U.S. government down with it. The decision to suspend was a
combination of politics and economics. Secretary of the Treasury
Salmon P. Chase embraced a policy of borrowing millions in coin
from the bank to finance the Union war effort. When the hope of
a quick Union victory dissipated in the fall of 1861, the capitalists
became fearful that the U.S. would drain them of all their
resources. When a delegation of bankers headed to Washington
D.C. in early January to confer with the government, they were
quite clear in their demands: they wanted the government to raise
taxes and use bank credit as the primary means of paying for the
23
war.
But the political mood of the country was against them. In
the press, the bankers of New York, Philadelphia, and Boston
were branded as traitors. In the House, Rep. Elbridge G.
23. HAMMOND, supra note 12 at 155–57; E.G. SPAULDING, A RESOURCE OF WAR—
THE CREDIT OF THE GOVERNMENT MADE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE, 18–21; Gallatin
on the Currency, BANKERS’ MAG. & STAT. REG., Feb. 1862, at 625; N.Y. HERALD, Dec. 6,
1861, at 3; N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 13, 1862, at 4–5.
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Spaulding took the lead in drafting a bill that would allow the
government to issue 150 million in treasury notes that would be a
legal tender. This would allow the government to meet its
financial obligations with less dependency on the capital of the
banks. Across the country, commentators embraced legal tender
24
as a war measure shorn of any complicated financial logic.
Unlike the old Treasury notes, this bill rested on force and
compulsion and would require the federal government to warp
and break the rules of finance capitalism in a new way. Congress
fretted over the implications of such an action. Under the old
Treasury note regime, the government offered its paper in
payment without forcing anyone to take them. In this way,
Treasury notes conformed to what might be called the rules of
finance capitalism in Europe and America. In both places,
governments financed their wars by attracting investors with a
reasonable return on their money. The legal tender notes sliced
through this logic by compelling the government’s creditors, and
creditors across the country, to take paper money with nothing
behind it but the faith of the government. Moreover, inflation
would affect prices in ways that no one could predict. As to its
constitutionality, many congressmen took solace in the fact that
the government has already been issuing paper money for some
time. Legal tender, they reasoned, was merely an extension of this
customary power. In the final analysis, most Republicans in
25
Congress voted for the bill with grave doubts. The fact that the
bill passed at all was a measure of their collective fear of an
economic collapse and the destruction of the Union war effort
from within.
While legal tender paper money was born out of wartime
necessity, the notes quickly became an attractive policy to replace
the regime of state bank notes. During the debates over the Legal
Tender Act, several congressmen hoped that this could be a viable
26
permanent solution to the state bank note problem. Moreover,
Americans across the country embraced what they called
“greenbacks” as they became more accustomed to them during
the Civil War. Petitions in the National Archives bear testament
24. Letter from J.C. Day to Sherman (Feb. 11, 1862), John Sherman papers, 17591897, vol. 46, Library of Congress; Letter from R. Buchanan to Sherman (Feb. 11, 1862),
John Sherman papers, 1759-1897, vol.46, Library of Congress; Letter from T.W. Olcott to
E.G. Spaulding, (Jan. 31, 1862), in Spaulding, supra note 23, at 51.
25. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d sess., 679, 691, 766, 796, 800, app. 56; THE STATE,
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION (Richard Sylla, Richard Tilly,
& Gabriel Tortella, eds., 1999).
26. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d sess., 688, 791, app., 57, 58.
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to how westerners especially embraced the idea of full federal
control of the monetary system by making greenbacks the legal
tender of the country and, as one petition put it, “authoriz[ing]
them to circulate among the people as a medium of exchange
27
forever.” This idea would only grow in the later 1860s as groups
of Republicans and Democrats in industrial and agricultural
regions demanded inflation as a key to economic growth.
IV. NATIONAL BANKING
Legal tender, however, was not the only possible solution to
the problems of the American monetary system. In December
1861, Chase proposed to solve the problem of the monetary
system by nationalizing the banks that created the money. Chase
had seen the value of a national currency system as governor of
Ohio in the aftermath of the Panic of 1857. Moreover, Chase’s
concerns about fixing the American monetary system echoed a
sizable amount of commentary after 1857 that increasingly looked
to some sort of national currency to fix the banks. Post-1857,
Chase and voices across the country argued for the existence of a
28
national currency power that could be used to stop the banks.
Chase proposed a system that solved the problems of
American finance by mixing Democratic ideology with a
Whiggish concern for the national economy. The bill proposed
that the government would charter banks that would then
purchase U.S. securities that would be used to secure the issue of
national bank notes. This was attractive for three reasons. First, it
would not crush states’ rights. The National Banking System
(NBS) would exist in tandem with the state systems. Chase hoped
that a majority of banks would convert to the NBS because they
saw it as financially attractive. Second, it obviated the need for a
27. “Petition of B.H. Smith and 41 other Citizens of Illinois…,” undated, “Petition
of Andrew Siders and 49 other citizens of Illinois,” undated, file HR 37A-G20.2, RG 233,
37th Congress, Records of the Ways and Means Committee, NARA.
28. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d sess., app.
23 (1861); SALMON P. CHASE, MESSAGE OF THE GOVERNOR OF OHIO TO THE FIFTYTHIRD GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT THE REGULAR SESSION COMMENCING JANUARY 4, 1858
14 (1858); Charles H. Carroll, Currency of the United States, 43 HUNT’S MERCHANT MAG.
& COM. REV. 574 (1860); Peter Cooper, Remarks on the Present Currency System, 14
BANKERS MAG. & STAT. REG. 81 (1859); The Currency and the Constitution, 41 U.S.
DEMOCRATIC REV. 1 (1858); Currency and Trade—The Duty of Government, 40 U.S.
DEMOCRATIC REV. 385 (1857); John A. Dix, New Views of the Currency Question, 13
BANKERS MAG. & STAT. REG. 513 (1859); National Currency, 16 AM. WHIG REV. 424
(1852); J.S. Ropes, Currency, Banking and Credit, 14 BANKERS MAG. & STAT. REG. 161
(1859); James Ross Snowden, Suggestions for a National Currency, 12 BANKERS MAG. &
STAT. REG. 609 (1858).
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single monster bank. Each bank would be rooted in its community
and beholden to the people’s representatives in Congress and not
the whims of a single BUS. Lastly, it was compatible with the gold
standard. During the war national banks could redeem their notes
in greenbacks, but with the resumption of specie payments, the
29
NBS would serve as a reform to the old system.
The bill had weak support. Several historians have stressed
that the bill passed because it would create a solid market for U.S.
securities. The reality is that that Congress passed the first version
of the National Banking Act in April 1863 because of inside
baseball on the part of Chase. Chase was able to enact his vision
by convincing President Abraham Lincoln, Senator John
Sherman, and the Cooke brothers, Jay and Henry. This collective
group pressured and cajoled enough in Congress to pass the act.
30
In the Senate, the bill passed by a single vote.
The critical turning point occurred between 1864 and 1865. It
is between those years that the last holdouts, the financiers of the
east and various Republican legislators, embraced national
authority over the currency. In 1864 Congress passed a second
National Banking Act that changed several aspects of the system,
including a pyramid reserve system that would empower New
York City banks. This time the NBA passed with almost total
31
Republican support. Former opponents, like Henry L. Dawes in
the House, accepted the national banking plan as a necessary
32
means “to cure an existing and acknowledged evil.” The reforms
were an active ploy by Chase to attract the biggest New York
banks to join the system, thus assuring the NBS’s success. More
importantly, Republicans in Congress accepted the NBS as
necessary to the country’s economic future. In 1865, Congress
passed a 10% tax on the banknotes of state banks and finally
destroyed the era of the Wildcats. With this, the NBS grew from
467 banks in 1864 to 1,294 banks in 1865. When the state banks
attempted to dismantle the system with a constitutional challenge,
a majority of the Supreme Court, now with Chase as the Chief
29. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d sess., 882; CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE, Nov. 12,
1864.
30. FREDERICK J. BLUE, SALMON P. CHASE: A LIFE IN POLITICS 158–61 (1987);
JOHN SHERMAN, RECOLLECTIONS OF FORTY YEARS IN THE HOUSE, SENATE AND
CABINET 299 (1895).
31. David M. Gische, The New York City Banks and the Development of the National
Banking System 1860-1870, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 21 (1979): 21–67; Richard S. Grossman,
U.S. Banking History, Civil War to World War II, EH.Net Encyclopedia, (Mar 16, 2008),
http://eh.net/encyclopedia/us-banking-history-civil-war-to-world-war-ii.
32. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d sess., 833 (1865).
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Justice, affirmed the idea that the federal government possessed
33
a broad national currency power over the country.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The greenbacks and national banks are not testaments to a
unified northern or Republican economic vision and have a larger
story than merely the wartime needs of 1861-1865. To the
contrary, the origins of the Legal Tender Act and the National
Banking Act defy any single Hamiltonian or Jacksonian origin.
What unites these laws is an impulse in American politics to use
national authority to reform the excesses of the unruly antebellum
economy. Beardian-style economic conflict emerged after the war
as the bifurcated greenback/national banking system fermented
conflict between regions and classes. Yet what we often miss in
these histories is the permanent transfer of power from a
heterogeneous monetary system to a nation of federally created
money. Various groups might argue over the medium of their
money and the amount for the rest of the century but never the
proposition that the federal government should control it. In this
sense the Beards were right that some form of consensus
motivated policy. Yet, that consensus created a powerful new
state that could simultaneously restrict and promote the freedom
of the market—depending on your interests.

33.

Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533 (1869).

